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Public Islam in the Contemporary World:   
A View on the American Case 
Rhys H. Williams 
 
Abstract 
The article reviews the status of the highly diverse community of American 
Muslims, with reference to US national identity and immigration history, history 
of Islam in the USA, and civil society organization. It is found that on average, 
and after the civil right movement of the 1960s, Muslims are very well assimilated 
into the US society and economy, in which the specific American civil society and 
religious organizations play an important enabling part, providing networks and 
inroads to society for newcomers as well as vehicles for preserving ethnic-
cultural distinctiveness. This broad pattern of development has not changed in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and ensuing wars on terror. Compared with the Nordic context, 
where Muslims are often considered challenging to a secular social order, 
American Muslims do not stand out as more or differently religious, or any less 
American, than other religious communities. It is tentatively concluded that, 
downsides apart, US national identity and civil society structure could be more 
favorable for the social integration of Muslims than the Nordic welfare state 
model.  
  
Thinking about Islam in the Nordic world, particularly in comparison with the United 
States, brings into relief long-standing issues in understanding religion in the modern 
world. On the one hand, there is the venerable theoretical framework generally called 
‘secularization theory’ that posits that industrialization produces a ‘modern’ society in 
which religion recedes into the private or personal sphere (if it continues to exist at all) 
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and in which the public becomes secular. The Scandinavian countries in many ways are 
the paradigmatic example of that theoretical expectation, as state churches have become 
largely irrelevant to politics and play a mostly ceremonial role in public life, and many 
if not most people live happily and well with little formal religious involvement. 
On the other hand, the United States has always been a statistical outlier in 
secularization theory, with continuing high rates of religious belief, attendance, and 
public impact, combined with significant economic development. While the institutional 
‘separation of church and state’ is written into the U.S. Constitution, religion matters in 
American politics, it shapes many aspects of American culture, and it is a vital part 
American civil society—including a central role in social welfare provision. 
Another deep assumption in much sociological theorizing posits that religion is integral 
to, and may be necessary for, social cohesion.
1
 From this perspective, religious diversity 
undermines the feelings of solidarity and the shared values and norms that enable 
smooth social functioning and collective identity. Again, the Nordic countries and the 
U.S.A. provide a contrast. The former are generally thought to be characterized by a 
high degree of collective identity and social solidarity, while the U.S.A. is socially 
diverse, with marked strains of cultural individualism. Moreover, the U.S.A. has been a 
vibrant empirical example of religious pluralism, as it may now be the most religiously 
diverse country in the world.  
It should be noted that secularization theory may not be quite so ‘wrong’ concerning the 
U.S. case, as there is evidence that church attendance reports are inflated and religious 
groups significantly accommodate secular culture (e.g., Hadaway, et al  1993; Demerath 
and Williams 1992; C. Smith 2003).  Further, religious diversity in the U.S.A. may not 
be a true religious ‘pluralism’—that is, the social fact of diversity is well beyond the 
cultural value that celebrates such differences; indeed, many Americans see religious 
diversity as a threat to their society. 
                                                 
1
 The classic statement of this perspective is found in Emile Durkheim’s (1912/1995), but it has appeared 
in many forms by many different authors; see, for example, Peter L. Berger (1967).  
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Whatever one holds about the general trajectory of religion, the visible role of Islam in 
world affairs in the past few decades—from the revolution in Iran, to the repelling of the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, to the attacks of 9/11, to the recent ‘Arab Spring’—
seems to be the paradigmatic case of Casanova’s (1994) ‘de-privatization’ of religion.  
As Juergensmeyer (1993) noted, the secular nationalism and liberal nation-state that 
were central to modernization theory failed people in much of the global semi-
periphery, whatever the success in the developed North and West.  In many Islamic 
societies these political and economic failures clearly set the stage for the type of 
‘religious nationalism’ that many Islamist movements advocate. And many Western 
societies, including the U.S.A. and the Nordic nations, are experiencing, and often 
struggling with, a fairly recent influx of Muslim immigrants. Thus, the role of religion 
in contemporary society has attained renewed urgency, and much of it centres on Islam 
and the West. 
This essay will make the argument that the situation of Islam in the U.S.A. must be 
understood within the context of a society particularly accommodating towards 
religious diversity. Due to its history of immigration, a culture of individualism, and a 
structure of civil society that is open to minority group initiatives, the U.S.A. has the 
resources to accommodate new populations successfully. One result is that some of the 
challenges facing Nordic societies as they deal with current Muslim immigrants are less 
pressing in the U.S.A., and at the least, American society will respond to them 
differently. Through a review of the history of immigration and religious diversity in the 
U.S.A., and Islam’s developing place in it, I argue that far from this being an 
exceptional historical moment, the current challenges fit within a longer national story 
that has usually ended ‘successfully’. Several institutional, legal, and cultural features of 
the U.S.A. have produced the combination of high religious involvement along with 
economic development (see also Warner 2008). That religious involvement, particularly 
among immigrants and religious minorities, is about much more than belief in the 
divine. Religious organizations do significant sociological work and—intentionally or 
not—are important players in the process of immigrant incorporation. 
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Islam in U.S. History 
In some ways, the story of Islam in the U.S.A. is an old story in that there have been 
small numbers of Muslims in North America for many years. For example, there have 
been Muslims in the Chicago area since the 1893 Columbian Exposition, for which a 
small number of Muslims from around the world travelled for the Midway’s exhibits.2 
More significantly, beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century, groups of 
Muslims emerged in the U.S.A. within African-American communities in several cities 
(an undetermined number of African slaves brought to the Americas were Muslim as 
well). The most significant of these communities eventually developed into the Nation 
of Islam, now headquartered in Chicago, but other Islamic sectarian groups and 
communities developed in New York, Detroit, and other major cities (see J. Smith 
2010; McCloud 2003). 
These communities, while significant in terms of their place in African-American 
history, and being wonderful examples of the innovative and syncretic character of 
American religion, did not force many Americans to deal with Islam as a public 
religion, that is, as a major part of the American religious mosaic that would need to be 
encountered in public life. The political, economic, and social isolation of African 
Americans in residential ghettos and working-class jobs—during a period of both de 
jure and de facto racial apartheid—kept African-American Islam from making much of 
an impact on the wider American society until relatively recently. Whatever its 
contributions to Black America, African-American Islam did not make much of an 
impression on the white majority. Thus, it is reasonable to understand the public issues 
connected to Islam in the U.S.A. as being a development of the post-1965 era of 
immigration, and its attendant concerns with diversity, pluralism, and post-9/11 national 
security. 
                                                 
2
 See Schmidt (2004). The ‘Midway’ was the part of the Exposition’s grounds that featured cultural nad 
social displays of peoples from many different parts of the world.  It was a key reason the Exposition was 
often referred to as the ‘World’s Fair.’  
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Immigration to the United States 
From the early 1920s until 1965, U.S. immigration policy was a national quota system. 
A designated number of immigrants were granted admission to the country each year; 
the quota number was based on a percentage (2%) of the number of persons of that 
nationality already present in the U.S. population (Daniels 1990; Zolberg 2006).  The 
quota system was designed to reproduce a population mostly descended from western 
and northern Europeans, and overwhelmingly Protestant Christian (with a significant 
minority of Roman Catholics). The policy developed in response to the fact that the 
immigrants arriving in the U.S.A. from the 1880s to 1920 were disproportionately from 
southern and eastern European countries (e.g., Italy, Greece, Poland, and Russia) and 
were Catholic and Jewish. These immigrants prompted nativist worries that the U.S.A. 
was losing its western European, Protestant character. Indeed, this nativist concern is 
shown clearly in that the first quota policy in 1920 pegged its quota numbers not to the 
U.S. population in that year, but to the numbers in the 1890 U.S. census—when the 
population had been even more western European and Protestant. Further, immigrants 
from East Asia were almost totally barred by the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 
1909 ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ with Japan; thus, the 1920–65 period saw very small 
numbers of Asian immigrants (many of them Japanese and Korean ‘war brides’ of 
American military personnel). It should be noted, however, that a policy known as the 
bracero programme actually encouraged low-wage agricultural labour from Mexico 
(demonstrating the complicated ways in which U.S. immigration policy has been a mix 
of cultural, political, and economic concerns; Zolberg 2006:245). 
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act changed the quota system by raising the 
total number of immigrants allowed in, and altered the quotas from being based on 
individual nations to a division between the eastern and western global hemispheres. 
These changes produced two significant effects. Over the next decades the pace of 
immigration picked up, as more people were allowed in and those countries with more 
eager migrants were less restricted by national quotas. Second, the regions of origin for 
immigrants changed dramatically, and for the first time in national history the bulk of 
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immigration began to come from non-European countries, in particular countries in East 
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Ironically, while the 1965 Act did impose a 
quota on the Western Hemisphere, between economic pressures and relatively loose 
border security Mexicans now made up a significant portion of current immigrants. 
Along with the post-1965 expansion of racial and ethnic diversity in new immigrant 
populations came religious diversity, and for the first time large numbers of Muslim, 
Hindus, and Buddhists began arriving in the U.S.A. (Wuthnow 2005).  While the U.S.A. 
remains an overwhelmingly Christian country (estimates are about 75% of those 
identifying with a religion are at least nominally Christian), there were significant 
numbers of non-Christian, non-western religious people, and buildings, for the first 
time. Just as was the case with the arrival of substantial numbers of Catholics in the 
1840s and ‘50s, and the very visible numbers of Jews in the 1890s–1910s, the large and 
visible numbers of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists have become for some a source of 
political and cultural concern—and at the same time a source of national pride at the 
American ability to absorb religious diversity (Wuthnow 2005:75-78). 
Consistent with this history, most immigrant Muslims to the U.S.A. came after the 1965 
legal and policy changes. As noted, there were small numbers of immigrant Muslims 
prior to then (many from Turkey or the Balkans), however, the rapid growth since the 
1970s has led to a general distinction in American Islam between ‘immigrant’ and 
‘indigenous’ (mostly meaning African American) Muslims; about 66–70% of current 
U.S. Muslims are either immigrants or descendants of recent immigrants (Leonard 
2007).  Most of these are either from the South Asian subcontinent (about one third of 
all U.S. Muslims) or the Arab world (slightly over one quarter). This means that the 
American Muslim community is highly diverse racially, culturally, and ethnically. In 
general, the Muslim community is fairly well educated and has significant numbers of 
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professionals, small business owners, and others in the middle class (Pew Research 
Center 2007).
3
 
It should be noted that these figures on religious affiliation, diversity, and demographic 
characteristics are approximations. The provisions of the U.S. Constitution that separate 
church and state have been interpreted to mean that government-sponsored information 
gathering does not ask individuals about their religious affiliations, beliefs, or practices. 
Consequently, what is the best, most complete, dataset about the American people (the 
decennial census) does not include religion. Of course, religious organizations keep 
membership records, but the accuracy of those records, and the varying definitions used 
by different religious institutions as to who counts as a ‘member’, mean that those 
numbers are not particularly reliable. 
The best efforts at counting the religious affiliations of individual Americans have come 
from social scientists—since 1972 in the General Social Survey conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, and the more recent 
American Religious Identification Survey by the Leonard E Greenberg Center at Trinity 
College in Hartford, Connecticut. These surveys estimate that approximately three-
quarters of the U.S. population identify as ‘Christian’, about 14–16% express no 
religious affiliation, about 2–3% are Jewish, while Buddhism, Hinduism, and ‘others’ 
comprise 2.5–3%. These numbers mean that just about 1% of the American people 
consider themselves Muslim, at the time of writing about 3 million (Kosmin and Keysar 
2009; Pew Research Center 2007).  This number is politically controversial, with both 
those promoting Islam in the U.S.A., and those deeply concerned about the number of 
Muslims in the country, often using numbers in the range of 6 or 7 million. As Tom 
Smith of the National Opinion Research Center has shown (2001; 2002), for those latter 
numbers to be true, every reputable academic and scholarly survey would need to be off 
                                                 
3
  This education and occupation profile is partly explained by the preferences in American immigration 
policy toward admitting those with education and easily marketable job skills; see also, Pew Research 
Center (2007).   
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by a factor of two.  The numbers are increasing fairly rapidly, but approximately 3 
million is the best estimate from the best surveys now. 
The Response to Muslim Immigration 
Americans’ attitudes about immigrants have varied over time; they also vary based on 
the specific immigrants in question. Some newcomers have always been more 
‘acceptable’ than others; as Zolberg (2006:1) says, ‘A nation of immigrants, to be sure, 
but not just any immigrants.’  In a country founded by and overwhelmingly populated 
by northern and western European Protestants, the variation in acceptance has been 
embedded in racial and religious identities. Many of the fears about immigrants seem to 
revolve around similar themes—for example, the threat to national or cultural identity, 
or the economic threat of low-wage work—but these memes are applied to groups 
differentially, usually based on racial or religious ‘otherness’ (see Williams 2013). 
This intersects, then, with other cultural and racial suspicions. While the presence of 
significant numbers of Muslim immigrants is a fairly recent development, scholars have 
noted a long history of suspicion of Muslims and Arabs manifested in American media, 
popular culture, and cultural stereotypes (Cainkar 2009:64-68).  Building on these 
images in recent decades were tensions with Middle Eastern oil-producing states since 
the 1970s, the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, and the continuing loyalty to Israel felt by 
many Americans. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 all of these 
suspicions and assumptions were easily resurrected and often manifested in xenophobia, 
nativism, and political fears. Incidents of harassment and hate crimes against Muslims 
(and people perceived to be Muslim—for example, a Sikh man was shot to death in 
Arizona) increased and many Muslims reported an increased sense of being watched 
and being treated as less than fully ‘American’ (Peek 2010).  Further, a general cultural 
wariness of Islam may be increasing in the U.S.A., according to Bail (2012). 
Other incidents reveal the ways in which what may be generalized social and cultural 
anxiety have been recently focused on Muslims. For example, the state of Oklahoma 
adopted an amendment to the State Constitution in 2010 that would forbid its courts 
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from accommodating Islamic Shar’ia law (the amendment was struck down by a 
Federal appeal court in January 2012). This even though Oklahoma’s population is less 
than 1% Muslim and no other religiously based legal system was mentioned in the 
amendment. In another high profile example, Terry Jones, leader of a conservative 
Christian centre in Florida, has on more than one occasion publicly burned copies of the 
Qur’an. And there have been public demonstrations against the building of mosques in 
places as diverse as New York City, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and Riverside County, 
California. 
However, the backlash that might have been expected post-9/11 in many ways did not 
materialize. Without discounting the many examples of discrimination or harassment, or 
the extent to which Muslim Americans have experienced a sense of ‘homeland 
insecurity’ (Cainkar 2009), the American majority’s response in the twenty-first century 
has been qualitatively different from the relocation camps in which Japanese-Americans 
were confined in World War II. And there has been nothing approaching the communal 
violence that has often marked inter-religion conflict in India, Nigeria, or the U.S.A. in 
the 1850s.  Many Americans express suspicion of, or worry about, Muslims in the 
U.S.A.; many are willing to curtail Muslims’ civil rights as a result (Wuthnow 2005).  
But many others do not share those concerns, or do not think that such concerns should 
result in severe curtailment of civil liberties, or discrimination, or anti-immigrant 
reform.  
For many American Muslims, their commitment to the U.S.A. and to the lives they are 
building there was mostly unshaken in the last decade and has often intensified. Cainkar 
(2009) found that the sense of insecurity about being distrusted was accompanied by a 
simultaneous appreciation for life in the U.S.A. and a sense of being ‘American’. The 
Pew Research Center (2007) subtitled a report on Muslim Americans ‘Middle Class and 
Mostly Mainstream’.  Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) found that in many ways 
Muslims became more ‘American’ following 9/11.4  The organizations that represent 
                                                 
4
 Echoing this theme, see also Bilici (2011) and Williams (2010).  
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the interests of Muslims in America, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), became more active and professionalized after the attacks, and incorporated 
into their claims the very American themes of individual rights, civil liberties, and 
religious freedom. And fascinatingly, there is evidence that even while anti-Muslim 
messages may be more prevalent than before 9/11, attitudes towards Muslims and 
suspicion of Islam have not significantly affected native-born Americans’ concerns 
about immigration. That is, while security issues have been and remain one argument 
for curtailing current rates of immigration into the country, those most concerned about 
immigration are often most concerned about unauthorized immigration, and that 
concern focuses on immigrants from Mexico and Latin America (Timberlake and 
Williams 2012). 
Nonetheless, post-9/11 the U.S.A. has thrown a public light on Islam and produced a 
vibrant debate about its place in the American religious and social mosaic. During 
controversies over mosque building or Shar’ia law some Americans have loudly 
proclaimed that America is a ‘Christian Nation’ and thus Islam fundamentally does not 
belong (Williams 2011).  On the other hand, consistent immigration by people of 
Islamic origins—often having education and skills needed by the U.S. economy, who 
have deep commitments to education and family, and in a context in which increasingly 
significant second and third generations are becoming comfortable in the U.S.A., have 
convinced many scholars that full incorporation of Islam into the U.S.A. is mostly a 
matter of time (Williams 2011). 
American Incorporation of Immigrant Populations 
There has been a lively debate among scholars about the ways in which immigrant 
populations are incorporated—or not—into American society. In the mid-twentieth 
century the dominant paradigm was one of ‘assimilation’. The view was that the 
incorporation process developed more or less naturally through incorporation of new 
immigrants into the economy, the adoption of cultural values, and then integration into 
social networks (the classic statement is Gordon 1964). Given the historical period, it is 
not too surprising that this idea fitted the general trend of European groups that came to 
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the U.S.A. in the nineteenth century. Critics of this perspective argued that while it was 
applicable to certain European immigrants in particular historical circumstances, it was 
far from a universal process, even during the historical heyday of late nineteenth-
century immigration. Criteria such as immigrants’ skin colour, skills and human capital 
assets, and other cultural markers (such as language or religion) determined different 
trajectories for different groups. The accumulation of these critiques meant that for 
some time the term ‘assimilation’ was rarely used in sociological writing. The continued 
disadvantage of racial groups such as African Americans, Native Americans, and dark-
skinned Latino/as seemed to undercut the ‘America as a nation of immigrants’ narrative. 
The post-1965 immigrant groups have been as varied in circumstances as they are in 
national origin and religion, however. As a result, the blanket rejection of assimilationist 
ideas has also needed some re-thinking. Drawing on more recent analyses of newer and 
often middle-class immigrants, Portes and Zhou (1993) introduced the idea of 
‘segmented assimilation’.  They noted that many immigrant communities, particularly 
those with a growing second generation, were prospering in the American economy and 
flocking to higher education—yet they were not becoming thoroughly assimilated in 
terms of cultural or social networks. Immigrant communities were maintaining 
religious, ethnic, and sometimes even linguistic continuity with their homelands, but 
were moving relatively smoothly into the host country’s economy. This was true not 
just of small business owners who served the immigrant community itself, but the 
incorporation was also powered by engineers, professionals, computer programmers, 
and others in solidly middle-class niches. In sum, the assimilation was segmented—
structurally and economically integrating while maintaining some cultural distinction. 
And it was segmented among different immigrant groups, some incorporating well and 
others staying quite apart. Tellingly, the vehicle for this cultural preservation is often 
religious organizations, especially for the first generation and often for their children. 
Religion and the New Immigrants 
Religion has been a key part of American culture and society since the early national 
period of the early nineteenth century. In a sparsely settled, largely agricultural society, 
Rhys H. Williams, Public Islam in the Contemporary World 
 
 
 
Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, The Nordic Welfare State, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2014 
 
67 
local religious congregations were the foremost organizations of American civil society, 
with a social influence so pervasive that Alexis de Tocqueville, in his deeply influential 
Democracy in America, wrote: 
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it 
must be regarded as the first of their political institutions; for if it does not 
impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of it … I am certain that they 
hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions. (de 
Tocqueville 1835/2003:295)   
Further, as Max Weber re-affirmed in an essay based on his travels in the United States 
in the first years of the twentieth century, church membership was taken to be an 
important sign of social respectability and community membership. It had significant 
cultural meaning, as well as being key to social and economic networks and 
opportunities (Weber 1958).  And, as is often reported in political polls and scholarly 
surveys, religion remains so important in American culture that many Americans report 
they would not vote for an atheist for President and they consider atheists significantly 
different from themselves (Edgell et al. 2006). 
Thus, there is a long history of new immigrants to the U.S.A. finding religious 
institutions to be enormously useful in adapting to their new home. Some of this is 
about religious faith and the comfort, guidance, and inspiration that faith can provide. 
But in sociological terms, the functionality of religious involvement is much wider. As 
sociologists have shown in the past decade or so, immigrants find religious 
congregations a place to relax, find comfort among compatriots, and maintain extended 
family connections—at the same time as they learn how to succeed in American 
education, make important business or employment connections, and draw upon 
collective expertise in navigating their dealings with native-born Americans (for 
examples, see Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000; Leonard et al. 
2005).  Religious congregations are places where immigrants build ‘social capital’, 
learning civic skills while remaining connected to a cultural and religious community 
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that can diffuse and de-fuse the potential alienation that comes with such a move (see 
Foley and Hoge 2007).  Thus, nurturing cultural and religious ties to their communities 
of origin is a vital process immigrants use in managing their simultaneous adaptation to 
new lives and a new society.   
More recent research shows that religious organizations can have similar functions for 
the second generation as well, if in somewhat different ways. The second generation is 
usually more facile with English language than their parents, and understands American 
culture in many other ways as well. They are often surrounded by non-immigrant peers 
in school, on sports teams, even in their neighbourhoods, yet their parents’ culture is 
also familiar, and their parents’ faith is often one they admire. As a result, religious 
organizations, some of which the second-generation members themselves found and 
run, provide a vital link between their parents’ immigrant culture and their American 
context (see Kim 2006; Min 2009; Warner and Williams 2010; Williams 2011).  
The organizational form of the religious voluntary association and the cultural route of 
the subcultural reproduction but economic incorporation are available to immigrants due 
to America’s historic cultural tolerance for religion and religious diversity. That 
tolerance may not be as expansive as national mythology holds, but one area in which 
Americans seem to tolerate and even promote differences is in religious expression. One 
of the reasons many immigrants become more involved with their religion in the U.S.A. 
as compared with their practice in their home countries is the legitimate place of 
religion in American civil society. Religious congregations are the most widespread and 
common form of organizational participation in American society—it is not too much 
of an exaggeration to say that one becomes ‘American’ through voluntary religious 
involvement. 
Religion in American Public Life 
I have argued thus far that there are two potentially contradictory streams in American 
culture regarding minority faith communities. On the one hand there is the cultural 
legitimacy of religion as a public identity in the U.S.A., while on the other hand there is 
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the social ‘otherness’ of minority identity and the assumption by many that the U.S.A. 
should be a ‘Christian nation’. In the case of Islam these two forces have led to a 
situation in which many American Muslims have begun to consider their primary 
identity as ‘Muslim’ rather than Pakistani, ‘Arab’ or some other ethno-racial or national 
identity. This development is dictated, in part, by the identities imposed on immigrants 
by native-born members of U.S. society. Many Americans do not know much about the 
world and the differences between Arabs and South Asians are not clear to them. 
Further, the recent salience of Islam worldwide, and the cultural Islamophobia that has 
long been a minor strain in American culture, means that the category of ‘Muslim’ has 
reached wide-spread public consciousness and has become an easy way to label people. 
So it may not be surprising that Muslim religious identity would get primacy. And, of 
course, many Muslims are deeply committed to their faith and their religious identity is 
important to them. The concept of the ummah means that many Muslims themselves 
prize religious identity over national, racial, or ethnic labels.   
Having a religious identity as a primary social identification has definite advantages in 
American society.
5
 It is common for Americans to engage in public life through 
organizations of civil society, especially religious congregations. That is acceptable and 
deeply legitimate culturally. Further, constitutional and legal protections of religious 
freedom reinforce the rights to free association, and make religious organizations a 
valuable, even critical, organizational form in the institutional order. The tax structure 
yields advantages to religious institutions in organizing collective action. Many of the 
social functions and services provided by the developed welfare state in western and 
northern European countries are thought to be properly handled by religious groups in 
the U.S.A. Thus, for a relatively new minority to push its religious identity and 
organizations to the forefront is a wise move socially and politically. 
                                                 
5
 Pyong Gap Min (2009) shows that among many second-generation Korean Americans, their Evangelical 
Protestant religious identity becomes more important than their ethnic-cultural identification. 
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America’s valuing of civil society and voluntary associations, and its lack of a 
developed welfare state, has implications for the tasks confronting religious 
organizations. The first task is, of course, the spiritual nurture and growth of 
congregants. But congregations, particularly for minority communities, often branch 
into providing services for community members. Childcare, language or job training 
classes, food banks, and emergency resources for families in distress are the types of 
services many congregations provide their members. It is for these reasons that new 
immigrants find religious organizations so socially useful as well as culturally 
important, as mentioned above (Williams 2007).  
As communities and populations grow, and particularly in cases where education and 
economic success lead to some prosperity among a segment of community members, 
other organizations form to seek wider influence in public affairs. Such organizations 
are the substance of what Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) call ‘organized Islam’— for 
example, the Council on American-Islamic Relations or the Muslim Public Affairs 
Council.  These organizations advocate on behalf of American Muslims, representing 
the interests of the community in civic discourse, speaking to elected officials, and 
sponsoring programmes that interpret Islam and Muslims to the general public. More 
recently, other organizations such as the American Muslim Alliance have developed 
with the distinct agenda of increasing political influence through electing Muslim 
politicians to office. One can see a progression from service provision within the 
community, to representing group interests, to speaking to the public on issues of 
particular importance to the Muslim community. This is a progression not unlike that 
experienced by other ethnic and religious groups in the U.S.A. At some point, one 
might expect American Muslim organizations to speak for the public rather than just to 
the public; that is, they may begin articulating a view of the public good on issues 
beyond those narrowly concerned with their own people. In this regard, the open nature 
of American civil society and the prominent place of religious institutions within it are 
specific resources for new immigrants generally and American Muslims specifically. 
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The Particularity of the American Case 
Both the Nordic countries and the U.S.A. are developed post-industrial societies with 
traditions of political democracy and civil liberties that make them attractive to 
immigrants; concomitantly, abetted by legal orders and cultural norms that protect and 
value social diversity, they are also places where newcomers can thrive. But there are 
significant differences between the U.S.A. and Nordic countries that have in turn shaped 
social responses to immigrants and the immigrants’ trajectories of adaptation. 
The first is that the U.S.A. is a very large country with a dramatically diverse 
population. Its history since its founding as a haven for immigrants from many parts of 
the world, along with regional variations in settlement patterns, have sometimes worked 
to diffuse immigrant populations and de-fuse anti-immigrant hostility. Combining with 
the social reality of immigration and diversity is the salient national mythology of the 
U.S.A. as a ‘nation of immigrants’. As noted above, the national story may paint 
American history as more accepting than it has been, but there is a decided history 
there, that even those wary about current immigration levels feel they must 
acknowledge and honor. Similarly, even though Christianity has been the de facto 
established faith in American society since the founding, both the legal protections for 
religious freedom and the cultural value placed on that freedom give those in other 
faiths a way to claim fidelity with American traditions. That the nation has not always 
lived up to its ideals does not mean that Americans cannot use those very ideals to call 
the current reality to account. Immigrants have powerful cultural claims on American 
identity, which has helped facilitate the incorporation of millions of migrants within the 
country. 
A second feature of the U.S.A. that has shaped immigrant adaptation and incorporation 
is American cultural individualism. This individualism has done much to prevent a 
state-based welfare system from developing as a truly equitable social safety net—
Americans are supposed to provide for themselves and are wary of governmental 
power. There is also a cultural presumption that people can—and should—remake 
themselves according to their own consciences. Voluntary commitments are valued, 
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even in religion it is the freely chosen religious identity that is viewed as authentic; the 
idea that one must be ‘born again’ to be truly committed is deeply anchored in 
American religious and political culture. The notion that America represents a ‘new 
world’, liberated from the strictures of the old, has given many immigrants the 
opportunities to forge new, hybrid identities. The American mythology of the western 
frontier is similarly about starting over and making a new life. This cultural theme has 
also produced among Americans some sense of obligation to accept such new identities 
among others who are striving to form new lives. The narrative of re-making oneself 
does put pressure on immigrants to assimilate, but it also pushes the native-born to 
accept newcomers. 
Importantly, this is often understood as a primarily individual process. Just as the 
American legal system instantiates and protects individual rather than collective rights, 
the trajectory through life is understood to be a matter of individual ability and will. A 
staple of American literature and film is the person overly constrained by societal 
norms, laws, or expectations from which they fight to free themselves (as opposed to 
mobilizing a collective action). ‘I did it my way’ is an iconic American sentiment. 
For immigrants—even those such as Muslims that meet with nativist suspicion—this 
individualism does provide a pathway around prejudice or social obstacles. It is neither 
complete nor equally open to all individuals in any given immigrant group. But many 
immigrants can forge culturally hybrid identities, emphasize their individual 
characteristics and attributes, and claim to be fully American. That they can do this 
while also claiming a minority religious faith and being involved in a vibrant 
congregation is the combination of contexts that has facilitated the incorporation and 
acceptance of many immigrants in American history, including contemporary Muslims. 
Conclusion 
I have painted a basically optimistic view of Islam in the U.S.A. I have offered an 
argument as to why the arrival and incorporation of Muslims into American life 
continues to progress—despite nativist fears, political suspicion, and a stratified racial 
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order. There is the risk of this seeming too idyllic. The U.S.A. has tremendous levels of 
economic inequality and poverty that it seems relatively unwilling to do anything about, 
and that would be unacceptable in most advanced, post-industrial societies. That 
Americans must rely more heavily on the voluntary associations of civil society than the 
welfare state to deal with this has meant that religious institutions remain important in 
society, but has not effectively addressed basic inequality. Racism, xenophobic 
attitudes, and an often inchoate Christian nationalism have led to external wars and 
internal hate crimes. Nonetheless, I am arguing that a de-centralized and privatized civil 
society, and a widespread cultural individualism, have decreased some of the points of 
tension and conflict between immigrants and native-born Americans over resources and 
often opened avenues into full social citizenship. It has moreover helped to keep 
religion vibrant in American life—as a valued cultural domain, a source of important 
social and economic resources, and a central part of American national mythology. 
Whatever the current prejudice against and the travails of American Muslims, I see no 
reason that these dynamics will not eventually result in their fuller incorporation into the 
U.S. social and religious mosaic. 
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